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I. INTRODUCTION
The institution of labor arbitration is tasked with resolving work-
place disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement. It is
not surprising that many of these disputes involve the same problems
that sometimes plague our larger society. In a sense, labor arbitration
awards provide a window on the workplace and society, revealing
problems of illegal drug use, alcohol abuse, race, sex and disability
discrimination, spouse and child abuse and a host of other ills. It is
not surprising, too, that Congress, state legislatures, and the courts
have sought to resolve these problems as well.1
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A. 1971, University of
Minnesota; J.D. 1975, Harvard University. This Article was written with sup-
port from a University of Toledo summer research grant. The author thanks Pe-
ter N. Lavalette, J.D. 1994, for his helpful research assistance and Ms. Pamela
Crabtree for her expert word processing assistance.
1. Given the fact that the percentage of the workforce represented by unions has
declined in recent decades, statutes, regulations, and court decisions play an in-
creasingly important role in the development and protection of workplace rights.
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Where an issue dealt with by a labor arbitrator is also covered by
public regulation, the arbitrator's award may be subject to challenge
in court on grounds that it allegedly violates the public policy behind
such regulation. Although such court review might seem like a good
thing in the abstract, it threatens long-standing values of national la-
bor policy protecting the finality of labor arbitration awards without
necessarily doing anything to foster the public policy at issue.
One area where such challenges have been raised is that of sexual
harassment in the workplace. The issue of determining when, if ever,
a court may overturn the award of a labor arbitrator reinstating a per-
son accused of sexually harassing a co-worker is an important one.
Courts have taken opposite positions and the Supreme Court has de-
nied certiorari.2 Commentators, too, have taken somewhat different
positions. 3
The larger issue, of which the sexual harassment cases are but a
part, involves the circumstances under which a court may overturn a
labor arbitration award on public policy grounds.4 The issue is
unresolved.
Also, it is not inconsistent with our national labor policy scheme that an indi-
vidual be protected by law even if he or she is represented by a union. Collective
bargaining representation, with its emphasis on majority rule, can only imper-
fectly protect rights such as freedom from discrimination. As Professor Clyde
Summers has suggested, "if collective bargaining does not protect the individual
employee, the law will find another way to protect the weaker party. The law,
either through the courts or the legislatures, will become the guardian." Clyde
W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7, 10 (1988).
2. Compare Newsday, Inc., v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d
840 (2d Cir. 1990)(overturning arbitration award reinstating accused harasser),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991) with Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Allied Industrial
Workers, 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.)(upholding arbitration award reinstating har-
asser), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304, and reh'g denied, 113 S. Ct. 643 (1992).
3. Compare Chris Baker, Comment, Sexual Harassment v. Labor Arbitration: Does
Reinstating Sexual Harassers Violate Public Policy?, 61 U. CiNc. L. REv. 1361
(1993)(suggesting courts should generally defer to arbitration award) and Chris-
tie L. Rozkowski & Robert F. Wayland, Arbitration Review: Is the Public Policy
Against Sexual Harassment Sufficient Cause for Vacating an Arbitration Award?,
LABon L.J., 707, 710 (1993)(suggesting narrow scope of review) with Thomas J.
Piskorski, Reinstatement of the Sexual Harasser: The Conflict Between Federal
Labor Law and Title VII, 18 EMPL. REL. L.J. 617, 622 (1993)("So long as the em-
ployer's disciplinary action falls within the range of 'appropriate sanctions' con-
templated by the regulations, then the employer's action does not violate the
public policy against sexual harassment." Author suggests, however, that award
should be vacated if arbitrator's penalty falls below "the minimally acceptable
'appropriate sanction.'") and Bret F. Randall, Comment, The History, Application
and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards,
1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759 (arguing for broad court review and asserting that nar-
row review on public policy grounds would rob the public policy exception of all
substance).
4. Commentators are split on this issue as well. Compare Harry T. Edwards, Judi-
cial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy
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In United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.,5 the
Supreme Court's most recent case on the standards for judicial review
of arbitration awards, the Court stated that it had granted certiorari
"[blecause the Courts of Appeals are divided on the question of when
courts may set aside arbitration awards as contravening public pol-
icy."6 Despite this intent to resolve the issue, however, the Court did
not do so, indicating that:
[we need not address the Union's position that a court may refuse to en-
force an award on public policy grounds only when the award itself violates a
statute, regulation, or other manifestation of positive law, or compels conduct
by the employer that would violate such a law.7
The issue remains open.
The author believes that this yet unanswered question should be
answered in the affirmative. An award should only be set aside if it
requires a party to commit an illegal act or violate positive law.
The reasons for adopting a narrow public policy review of labor ar-
bitration awards8 are especially well demonstrated by the cases in-
volving reinstatement of persons accused of sexual harassment.
This Article will first review the general standards for court review
of labor arbitration awards9 including the current status of the law
concerning review of awards on a public policy basis.10 The Article
will then identify the cases in which courts have struggled to balance
the importance of upholding labor arbitration awards against a per-
ceived conflict with the strong and acknowledged public policy against
sexual harassment.31 These cases will then be used to demonstrate
how a narrow review standard is most consistent with national labor
policyl 2 and how reviewing courts may not always understand the la-
bor arbitration process or appreciate the interests it protects. 13 The
Article asserts that most perceptions of a "conflict" between the poli-
cies of arbitral finality and prevention of sexual harassment are
flawed and that there is generally not a true conflict in policy even
Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 Cm.-KNT L. REv. 3, 4, 33 (1988)(attacking
broad public policy review cases as exercises in "unprincipled and unwarranted
judicial activism" and advocating rule allowing vacation only if award construes
agreement to compel violation of positive law) and Bernard F. Ashe, Arbitration
Finality and the Public Policy Exception 49 Dxsp. RESOL. J. 22 (Sept. 1994) with
Bernard Meltzer, After the Labor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy Defense,
10 INDus. REL. L.J. 241 (1988)(criticizing "limitist view").
5. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
6. Id. at 35.
7. Id. at 45 n.12.
8. See infra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 118-131 and accompanying text.
814 [Vol. 73:812
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where the arbitrator directs reinstatement. 14 The Article concludes
with a recommendation for a narrow standard of review and with sug-
gestions for advocates and arbitrators which should make it easier for
a court to uphold an award.15
II. BACKGROUND
A. Labor Arbitration and Policies of Finality
Labor arbitration as a means to resolve industrial disputes is of
relatively recent origin with its real growth as a means to resolve la-
bor-management contract grievances occurring only after World War
11.16 For this reason, the law in the area is also of recent origin. In its
1957 decision in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,17 and three 1960
decisions comprising the Steelworkers Trilogy,18 the Supreme Court
first discussed the importance of labor arbitration to national labor
policy. In Lincoln Mills, the Court held that section 301(a) of the La-
bor Management Relations Act19 authorized federal courts to fashion
federal law which would allow enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes.20
In 1960, the Court limited the power of courts to interpret collec-
tive bargaining agreements and explained the importance of the arbi-
trator's role in relation to the collective bargaining process. In the
14. See infra notes 132-164 and accompanying text. Because the focus of Title VII
sexual harassment policy is on protecting the work environment of the plaintiff
and not on punishing transgressors, courts have not required that employers al-
ways discharge employees guilty of sexual harassment. Thus, cases challenging
arbitration awards which reinstate persons accused of harassment often present
what could be termed a "false conflict." See WmLAm M. RicnsrN & WniLLm L
REYNOLDS, UNDERSTADmING CoNFuct OF LAws (2d ed. 1993).
15. See infra Parts VII-VIII.
16. R.W. Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MiCH. L. RIv.
1245, 1246 (1963). For a thorough review of the growth of labor arbitration, see
Dennis Nolan & Roger Abrams, American Labor-Arbitration: The Early Years, 35
U. FiA. L. REv. 373 (1983).
17. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
18. The three decisions, referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy, in which the
Supreme Court set forth the framework for deciding questions concerning the
relationship of federal courts to arbitration proceedings are United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). For a review of the Steelworkers Tril-
ogy, see Charles J. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, 33 Pnoc.
NAT'L ACAD. ARm. 331 (1980). Morris' article discusses standards for court review
of labor arbitration awards in the private sector under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). For a thorough discussion of
the public sector, see Ann C. Hodges, The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sec-
tor, 66 Cin.-KENr L. REv. 631 (1990).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
20. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
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first Trilogy case, United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing
Co.,21 the Court stated that courts "have no business weighing the
merits of the grievance" before enforcing the parties' promise to sub-
mit a grievance to an arbitrator.22 In United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co.,23 the second case of the Trilogy, the Court
framed a rule of presumption of arbitrability in a collective bargaining
agreement containing an arbitration clause.24 The Court noted: "An
order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 25 Writing for the
Court, Justice Douglas recognized the significance of arbitration to a
collective bargaining system:
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of
private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solu-
tion in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of
the parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is
actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective
bargaining agreement. 2 6
In the final Trilogy case, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp.,27 the Court set out its standard for review of an arbitra-
tion award:
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bar-
gaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to
reach a fair solution of a problem.... Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined
to interpretation and application of the collective bargain agreement; he does
not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look
for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbi-
trator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice
but to refuse enforcement of the awards.2 8
The Court went on to note that "[a] mere ambiguity in the [arbitra-
tor's] opinion accompanying the award.., is not a reason" to refuse
enforcement. 29 Rather, concluded the Court, parties bargain for the
arbitrator's construction of the contract; therefore, a court cannot
overrule an arbitrator's decision merely because its interpretation of
the contract differs from that of the arbitrator.30
21. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
22. Id. at 567-68.
23. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
24. Id. at 582-83.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 581.
27. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
28. Id. at 597.
29. Id. at 598.
30. Id.
[Vol. 73:812
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In its 1983 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International
Union of Rubber Workers31 decision, the Court emphasized the highly
deferential standard of review contemplated by Enterprise Wheel:
When the parties include an arbitration clause in their collective-bargaining
agreement, they choose to have disputes concerning constructions of the con-
tract resolved by an arbitrator. Unless the arbitral decision does not "dra[w]
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement," a court is bound to en-
force the award and is not entitled to review the merits of the contract dis-
pute. This remains so even when the basis for the arbitrator's decision may be
ambiguous. 32
The issue of whether an award "draws its essence" from the con-
tract, however, continued to be a substantial source of litigation. All
seemed to agree that courts are to exercise discretion and show defer-
ence to the awards of labor arbitrators but there was confusion over
the limits of such deference. Again, in 1987, the Court sought to out-
line approved standards for court review in United Paperworkers In-
ternational Union v. Misco, Inc.33 Misco involved the discharge of an
31. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
32. Id. at 764 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Cart Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960))(citations omitted). A number of distinguished commenta-
tors have argued for a narrow scope ofjudicial review of labor arbitration awards.
See David E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, 29 Paoc. NAT'L
AcAD. ARa. 97, 107 (1976)(deference to arbitral awards is result of "recognition
that arbitration is not a substitute for judicial adjudication, but a part of a system
of industrial self-governance"); Timothy J. Heinsz, Judicial Review ofLaborArbi-
tration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 Mo. L. Rv.
243 (1987); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., "His Own Brand of Industrial Justice": The
Stalking Horse of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REv. 881
(1983); Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of
Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 297-98 (1980)("It is to be hoped that
judges will learn to temper their activist instincts with an appreciation that the
agreement before them is a unique type of contract, and that an apparently erro-
neous award may in fact just reflect the creative search for special rules that the
parties need from their private judge, and for which they have negotiated."); The-
odore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MicH. L. Rav. 1137, 1160-61
(1977)(arbitrator is "reader" of parties' contract, his award becomes part of their
contract, and therefore courts defer to arbitrator whose award should stand, ab-
sent procedural violations or illegality of resulting contracts); Clyde W. Summers,
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 BuFF.
L. REv. 1, 27 (1953)(considering role of courts in reviewing merits of grievance,
author finds that "courts have a function, but it is the limited one of exercising
only enough supervision to prevent labor arbitration from destroying itself").
33. 484 U.S. 29 (1987). Even after Misco, courts have not uniformly given deference
to arbitration awards and commentators have again counseled a narrow scope of
review. See Mark Berger, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration: Practice, Poli-
cies and Sanctions, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 245 (1992); Charles B. Craver, Labor
Arbitration as a Construction of the Collective Bargaining, 66 Cm.-KNrr L. REv.
571 (1990); Susan A. Fitzgibbon, The Judicial Itch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 485
(1990); William B. Gould, IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, 64
No=ra DiA L. REv. 464 (1989); Douglas E. Ray, Protecting the Parties'Bargain
after Misco: Court Review of Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. 1 (1988); Clyde W.
1994] 817
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employee, Cooper, allegedly for marijuana use. The employee had
been found in the back seat of an otherwise unoccupied automobile,
belonging to another person, with a lighted marijuana cigarette in the
front-seat ashtray. Two other employees had left the car. The em-
ployer investigated and discharged Cooper on the basis that his pres-
ence in the car violated its rule against marijuana use on plant
premises.3 4 Cooper's grievance was processed to arbitration. Shortly
before the arbitration hearing, the employer became aware that the
police searched Cooper's car on the same day Cooper had been found
in the car with the marijuana cigarette and found gleanings of mari-
juana in his car.3 5
After a hearing, the arbitrator upheld the grievance and directed
the employer to reinstate Cooper with backpay and full seniority. The
arbitrator found that the employer had failed to prove that Cooper had
used or possessed marijuana on company property and that finding
Cooper in the back seat of a car with a burning cigarette in the front-
seat ashtray was insufficient proof.36 The arbitrator refused to accept
as evidence the fact that marijuana had been found in Cooper's car on
company property because the employer did not base its decision to
discharge on this fact, not knowing it at the time.37
In the employer's suit to vacate the award, the district court set
aside the award as contrary to a public policy against operation of
dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs as well as
state criminal laws.3 8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed,3 9 Judge Tate dissenting.40 The majority determined that re-
instatement would violate the public policy "against the operation of
dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or
alcohol."41
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether a
court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award rendered under a
collective bargaining agreement on public policy grounds only when
the award itself violates positive law or requires unlawful conduct by
the employer.42 In its opinion, however, the Court took no position on
Summers, The Trilogy and Its Offspring Revisited: It's a Contract, Stupid, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 1021, 1048 (1993)(providing a contractual standard which "looks
to the intent and expectations of the parties when they agreed to arbitration").
34. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 33 (1987).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 34.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 34-35.
39. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Intl Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
40. Id. at 743-46.
41. Id. at 743.
42. United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 46 (1987).
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this exact issue but, rather, reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals on other grounds. The Court ruled that the court of appeals
erred and exceeded its limited authority to review arbitration awards.
The court of appeals and the district court were not free to disregard
and overrule the arbitrator's factfinding and find for themselves that
the cigarette incident violated the employer's rule, nor could those
courts overrule the arbitrator on the evidentiary matter of whether to
consider the evidence of marijuana found in the grievant's car which
evidence was not available to the company at the time of discharge.43
Further, the courts lacked the power to set aside the arbitrator's
remedy.44
The Court stated that, with regard to the arbitrator's interpreta-
tion or application of the contract, "as long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the
scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious
error does not suffice to overturn his decision."45
B. Issues of Public Policy
The issue left unresolved in Misco of when, if ever, an arbitration
award should be overturned on public policy grounds is, as the
Supreme Court recognized in W.R. Grace, "ultimately one of resolution
by the courts."46 Two limits on a court's power in this area are now
well established. First, a court may not use public policy as a subter-
fuge to second-guess either the arbitrator's factual findings or his or
her reading of the contract. Second, courts must be careful to base
public policy arguments on "real" public policy rather than vague and
unsubstantiated notions of policy applied because they think an arbi-
trator erred. On the third limit, defining what it means for an award
to "violate" a public policy, the courts are in hopeless disarray.
In W.R. Grace the Court stated that
[a]s with any contract, however, a court may not enforce a collective-bargain-
ing agreement that is contrary to public policy... If the contract as inter-
preted by [the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy, we are obliged to
refrain from enforcing it. Such a public policy, however, must be well defined
and dominant, and is to be ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests."47
The Supreme Court reaffirmed these limits in its United
Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.48 decision which
43. Id. at 39.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Id. at 38.
46. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 795, Intl Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983)(citations omitted).
47. Id. at 768 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
48. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
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overturned a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that
the reinstatement of a person accused of drug use violated public pol-
icy. The Court stated, "we explicitly held in W.R. Grace that a formu-
lation of public policy based only on 'general considerations of
supposed public interests' is not the sort that permits a court to set
aside an arbitration award."49
Despite the narrowness of the W.R. Grace definition, lower courts
have overturned arbitration awards on public policy grounds in ways
which second-guess arbitrator's factual findings and apply "general
considerations of supposed public interests."50 A number of cases
arising before and after W.R. Grace and before Misco demonstrate the
intensity of the debate. Relying on a broad interpretation of public
policy, a number of courts have overturned awards on this basis. In
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen, Local 450 v. Great
Western Food Co.,51 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused
to enforce an award which ordered reinstatement of a tractor-trailer
driver who had been drinking on duty. The court asserted that "no
citation of authority" was needed to establish that enforcement of such
an award was against public policy, but went on to discuss court deci-
sions and federal regulations which evidenced a public policy against
drinking on the job by professional drivers.52
Similarly in United States Postal Service v. American Postal Work-
ers Union,53 the First Circuit denied enforcement of an arbitrator's
award directing reinstatement of a postal employee who admitted em-
bezzling money orders. The court relied on several federal statutes
regulating the conduct of postal employees and protecting the public
in its use of the postal service. 54
In Misco, the Fifth Circuit had refused to enforce an award which
required reinstatement of an employee who had been discharged for
drug use. The Fifth Circuit noted that the employee operated a "slit-
ter-rewinder" which the arbitrator had found to be "an unusually dan-
gerous machine."55 It found that there was a public policy "against
the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence
of drugs or alcohol" and that there were Louisiana statutes against
drug use.5 6 The arbitrator had ruled that the company did not prove
the employee to have violated its rule against possession or use of
drugs on company premises and that the discovery of a trace of marl-
49. Id. at 44.
50. Id.
51. 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983).
52. Id. at 124-25.
53. 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 825.
55. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 740 (5th Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
56. Id. at 743.
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juana residue in the employee's own car did not change the result be-
cause that discovery came after the discharge.
Rejecting the Fifth Circuit's view, the Supreme Court first noted
that the lower court's definition of public policy did not seem to com-
port with the requirement in W.R. Grace that a policy must be "ascer-
tained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests."57 The court of
appeals had not reviewed laws and legal precedents but rather drew
upon "general considerations of supposed public interests" in conclud-
ing that there was a policy against operating dangerous machinery
while under the influence of drugs.58
Second, the Court found that the Fifth Circuit erred in finding that
the discovery of marijuana gleanings in the grievant's car established
a violation of the policy against operating machinery while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. The Court felt this connection was "ten-
uous at best5 9 and, in any event, the drawing of inferences from the
evidence was for the arbitrator and not for the court of appeals.60 In
effect, the lower court had exceeded its authority by second-guessing
the factual determinations of the arbitrator. As the Court in Misco
stated: "The parties did not bargain for the facts to be found by a
court, but by an arbitrator chosen by them .... "61
A delegation of power to exercise "public policy" review of arbitra-
tors' awards requires safeguards and limits to prevent judges from ex-
ercising their own senses of justice, thus substituting their views for
those of the parties expressed in their contract. The term "public pol-
icy" will have different meanings to different persons. The possible
extent of a public policy theory left unchecked is demonstrated by an-
other Fifth Circuit case decided before Misco reached the Supreme
Court, Oil Workers, International Union, Local No. 4-228 v. Union Oil
Co.62 In that case, an employee was discharged after receiving a ten-
year unadjudicated probation for possession of prohibited drugs. The
arbitrator directed her reinstatement with back pay, noting that the
terms of her probation forbade drug use and that she had a strong
incentive to comply, and crediting her statements that she would re-
main drug-free.6 3 Shortly after the arbitration award, she tested posi-
tive for marijuana use in a company physical. Relying on the test, the
employer refused to reinstate her. She later tested positive in proba-
tion service tests. The district court refused to enforce the reinstate-
57. United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 44 (1987)(citation
omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 44-45.
61. Id. at 45.
62. 818 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1987).
63. Id. at 439.
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ment award, noting that while the arbitrator had assumed the
probation system would protect employer's interest, it did not. The
employee used drugs and her probation was not revoked and, in the
view of the court, the arbitrator's reliance on her promise was unjusti-
fied.64 The district court then found that enforcement of the reinstate-
ment award would violate public policy in light of the employee's
recent drug use and the probability of a safety hazard.65
Before the Fifth Circuit, the employer echoed this public policy ar-
gument. The union, on the other hand, responded by arguing a public
policy in favor of rehabilitation, a policy evidenced by the grant of
unadjudicated probation rather than confinement.
The Fifth Circuit found that the arbitrator was free "to credit the
public policy favoring drug rehabilitation and find that [the employee]
no longer used drugs and would not present a safety risk."66 In light
of the subsequent drug use, however, the court felt that public policy
could bar enforcement and remanded the issue to the arbitrator for
reconsideration in light of the employee's post-award drug use "to the
extent that this conduct proves his findings were based on an errone-
ous prediction."67
The message of Union Oil is clear. Under the broadest view, public
policy can mean whatever a judge wishes it to mean. If an arbitrator's
award were based not on the contract, but on his or her weighing of a
general public policy against drug use compared to a general public
policy in favor of rehabilitation, it would be vulnerable.68 A court
should not have such power to ignore the contract.
Even where there is a clear public policy, courts are in disagree-
ment as to what kind of arbitration award will violate such policy. A
number of federal appellate courts have shown a willingness to over-
turn arbitration awards on broad public policy grounds, especially
where allegations are made that public safety is involved.69 Other
64. Id. at 440.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 442.
67. Id. at 443.
68. "When an arbitrator bases his award on public policy considerations, he has over-
stepped his authority and the court may review the substantive merits of the
award." Local N. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workman v.
Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1982)("An arbitrator is not au-
thorized to substitute his own view of wise policy for that of the parties."). E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 618
(7th Cir. 1981)(Easterbrook J., concurring)(construing Ethyl Corp. v. United
Steelworkers, 768 F.2d 180, 183-85 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853
(1986)).
69. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl, 861 F.2d 665, 666-68
(11th Cir. 1988)(striking down award which reinstated pilot who flew while intox-
icated), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local
Union 204, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427-30 (8th Cir. 1987)(va-
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courts have been less willing to find public danger and less willing to
find violations of public policy in similar circumstances. 70
A number of courts and judges have taken a far more limited view,
believing that public policy review is "extremely narroW"71 and that
an arbitrator's decision should be overturned on public policy grounds
only when the decision requires someone to act unlawfully. 72 Two
Ninth Circuit decisions provide examples. In Amalgamated Transit
Union, Local 1309 v. Aztec Bus Lines,73 the arbitrator ordered the re-
instatement of a bus driver who violated company policy by driving a
bus despite knowing that its brakes were faulty. The court held that
the arbitrator's order did not violate public policy. Taking a narrow
view of the public policy exception, the court stated: "We agree that
cating, for public policy reasons, arbitrator's reinstatement of nuclear power
plant employee discharged for violating safety regulations); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local 540 v. Great Western Food, 712 F.2d 122,
125 (5th Cir. 1983)(reversing arbitrator's reinstatement of over-the-road truck
drive who drank liquor while on duty); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (7th
Cir. 1982)(work rule which forbade employees from reporting unsanitary condi-
tions directly to government officials violated public policy); World Airways, Inc.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800, 803-04 (9th Cir. 1978)(vacating
arbitrator's reinstatement of airline pilot who had been demoted for judgmental
deficiencies); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 788 F. Supp. 829,
842-43 (D.N.J. 1992)(vacating reinstatement of able-bodied seaman who was
found to have marijuana in his system during duty); Georgia Power Co. v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531, 533-34 (N.D. Ga.
1989)(vacating reinstatement of power company employee responsible for check-
ing various meters and gauges to ensure that high pressure equipment did not
overheat because employee was chronic drug user), aff'd, 896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir.
1990).
70. Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1216-17
(9th Cir. 1989)(no dominant public policy that bars reinstatement of mechanic
who improperly placed lug nuts on vehicles), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990);
Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 856 F.2d 1174, 1182
(8th Cir. 1988)(arbitration award of backpay for discharged employees does not
implicate public safety concerns because it does not return potentially dangerous
employees to workplace); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl,
808 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(arbitration award reinstating pilot who piloted
flight within twenty-four hours of consuming alcohol and who had blood alcohol
level in excess of Federal Aviation Administration (the "FAA") regulations not
violative of public policy because it was conditioned on FAA's recertification of
pilot), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988).
71. United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239,
1241 (D.C. Cir.)(per curiam)(holding that district court erred when it vacated
award reinstating letter carrier who pled guilty to unlawful delay of mail), cert.
granted in part, 481 U.S. 1301 (1987), and cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988).
The arbitrator's judgment on "just cause" was "precisely what the parties had
bargained for" and the "extremely narrow" public policy exception gave the lower
court no grounds to proscribe the reinstatement. Id.
72. See E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d
611, 617-20 (7th Cir. 1986)(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
73. 654 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam).
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forcing a party to a collective bargaining agreement to break the law is
against public policy, but no California statute has been called to our
attention which would make it illegal to employ bus drivers who have
previously shown bad judgment."74
In Bevles Co. v. Teamsters Local 986,7 5 an arbitrator ordered the
reinstatement of two employees fired when their employer learned
they were undocumented aliens. The court held that the award did
not "violate [ I a clearly defined public policy... [since] [neither the
company nor its employees are subject to any criminal or civil liability
under federal law arising from their employment relationship."7 6
Other courts have refused to overturn, on public policy grounds,
awards directing reinstatement of drug users,77 letter carriers plead-
ing guilty to unlawful delay of mail,7 8 persons assaulting supervi-
sors, 79 and gamblers.8 0 In another case, a court enforced an award
directing reinstatement of a religious program radio announcer de-
spite the argument that enforcement of the award would infringe on
the First Amendment rights of the employer radio station.8 ' As Judge
Easterbrook noted, in disagreeing with the concept of a broad public
policy inquiry:
I find the principle itself objectionable. A power to set aside awards on
grounds of public policy, as distinct from rules of law, is too sweeping. A court
lacks this power for the same reason the arbitrator does-the function of arbi-
74. Id. at 644.
75. 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 985 (1987).
76. Id. at 1392-93 (footnote omitted).
77. See Big Three Indus. v. International Longshoremen's Union, Local 142, 124
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3173 (D. Haw. 1987)(upholding award directing reinstatement of
two employees discharged for engaging in drug-related offenses on property of
employer, finding no statute making it unlawful for the employer to reinstate
employees); S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Intl Union, Local 1069, 632
F. Supp. 463 (D. Me. 1986)(upholding arbitration award reinstating three em-
ployees discharged for drug possession, sale or use and holding that suspension
substituted for discharge does not violate public policy), rev'd, 815 F.2d 178 (1st
Cir.), and cert. granted and judgment vacated, 484 U.S. 983 (1987).
78. See United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Ltter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
79. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d
611 (7th Cir. 1986).
80. See Local 453, Intl Union of Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d
Cir.)(enforcing contract interpreted by arbitrator to require reinstatement of com-
pany employee who violated company rule against gambling on premises and was
convicted of a misdemeanor), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963). In Otis Elevator,
the court found that the public policy represented by the New York statutory
prohibition was vindicated by criminal conviction and further vindicated by a
seven-month uncompensated layoff upheld by the arbitrator. The court also
found no "greater vindication of the public condemnation of gambling. . ." was
required. Id. at 29.
81. Communication Workers v. Radio Station WUFO, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2986
(W.D.N.Y. 1985).
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trator and court is to carry out a contract, and contracts bind unless made
unlawful by rules of positive law.82
While strict adherence to the W.R. Grace requirements of a "well de-
fined and dominant" public policy "ascertained 'by reference to the
laws and legal precedents"'83 can limit some overreaching by courts,
there is hopeless confusion over what kind of conflict is necessary to
establish the next requirement, that the contract "violates some ex-
plicit public policy."S4 This issue is the focus of those cases reviewing
arbitration awards which direct the reinstatement of persons dis-
charged for sexual harassment.
III. COURT REVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
DISCHARGE CASES
The degree of confusion and uncertainty over what kind of "con-
flict" is necessary to cause an arbitration award to "Violate" public pol-
icy is best demonstrated by cases involving accusations of sexual
harassment. These cases focus explicitly on the conflict issue because
the existence of a clear public policy is not questioned.
A. The Public Policy
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin."s5 This proscription has been applied to
bar workplace sexual harassment.
In its 1986 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 86 decision, the
Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits sexually offensive conduct
in the workplace that is sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a
hostile work environment based on sex.8 7
In its 1993 decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,88 the Court
confirmed its Vinson holding and further ruled that proof of psycholog-
ical harm is not essential to a harassment claim under Title VII. The
standard set in Harris is whether conduct is "severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-
82. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611,
618 (7th Cir. 1986).
83. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 795, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a)(1)(1988).
86. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
87. Id. at 66 ("[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that dis-
crimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.").
88. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
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an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abu-
sive."89 In terms of applying this test, the Court does not provide a
precise test for determining whether harassment has occurred.
Rather, the Court majority suggests that
whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the dis-
criminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or hu-
miliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance. 90
These standards have been expanded and defined in various Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines and regula-
tions91 to which the Supreme Court has often referred.92
B. The Cases
Although not numerous, the cases reviewing sexual harassment
reinstatement awards by arbitrators reveal a great disparity in how
broadly courts perceive their power to find a violation of public policy
on which to base a vacation. Some courts view their powers as very
broad.
89. Id. at 368.
90. Id. at 371. It is not entirely clear whether, by this statement, Justice O'Connor
meant to reject the "reasonable woman" standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
91. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which enforces Title VII, has
established a guideline stating:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when... (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably in-
terfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1994)(footnote omitted). In its Compliance Manual, the
EEOC has stated that the Commission will presume that
unwelcome, intentional touching of a charging party's intimate body ar-
eas is sufficiently offensive to alter the conditions of her working envi-
ronment and constitute a violation of Title VII. More so than in the case
of verbal advances or remarks, a single unwelcome physical advance can
seriously poison the victim's working environment.
EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, reprinted in Fair Empl. Prac.
Man. (BNA), at 405:6681, 6691 (March 19, 1990). The EEOC Guidelines suggest
that an employer is liable for sexual harassment between fellow employees of
which it knew or should have known, "unless it can show that it took immediate
and appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)(1994).
92. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court stated
that the EEOC Guidelines, as an administrative interpretation of Title VII,
"while not controlling... constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id. at 65 (cita-
tions omitted). The Court also stated that EEOC Guidelines "drew upon a sub-
stantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII
affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Id. at 65.
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In Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915,93
for example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
vacation of an arbitration award which reinstated, without back pay,
an employee discharged for sexually harassing female co-workers.
The grievant was found by the arbitrator to have engaged in unwel-
come touching of female co-workers but was reinstated due, in part, to
the employer's failure to follow progressive discipline. The court felt
that the arbitration award should be vacated because it "condoned"
the employee's conduct, tended to "perpetuate a hostile, intimidating
and offensive work environment," and prevented the employer "from
carrying out its legal duty to eliminate sexual harassment in the
workplace." 94
Similarly, in Stroehmann Bakeries v. Local 776, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,95 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
overturned an arbitration award directing reinstatement, with back
pay, of an employee discharged for violation of a work rule prohibiting
immoral conduct. The employee had been accused of sexually harass-
ing a customer while making a delivery. Following the discharge, the
union brought a claim to arbitration under the grievance procedure
set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator con-
cluded that the employee was not given a full opportunity to refute the
claim of sexual harassment and ordered the employee reinstated with
back pay. Subsequently, the district court vacated the arbitration
award as being contrary to public policy. 9 6
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling.
The court in Stroehmann stated "[tlhere is a well-defined and domi-
nant public policy concerning sexual harassment in the workplace."97
The court further stated there is a "dominant public policy favoring
employer prevention and application of sanctions against sexual har-
assment in the workplace."9 8 It stated that such policies are referred
to in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and regulations pro-
mulgated thereunder by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
The court stated that "an award which fully reinstates an em-
ployee accused of sexual harassment without a determination that the
harassment did not occur violates public policy."99 The court found:
[The arbitrator's] award would allow a person who may have committed sex-
ual harassment to continue in the workplace without a determination of
whether sexual harassment occurred. Certainly, it does not discourage sexual
93. 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).
94. Id. at 845.
95. 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992).
96. Id. at 1437-38.
97. Id. at 1441.
98. Id. at 1442.
99. Id.
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harassment. Instead, it undermines the employer's ability to fulfill its obliga-
tion to prevent and sanction sexual harassment in the workplace.1 0 0
The court directed that the case be remanded for a de novo hearing
before another arbitrator.O1
In contrast, other courts have upheld the awards of arbitrators
reinstating employees who had committed acts of sexual harassment.
In Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Industrial
Workers,102 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the
award of an arbitrator who reduced to a thirty day suspension the dis-
charge of an employee who had intentionally grabbed the breasts of a
co-worker. The employer had attacked the award on public policy
grounds. The court upheld the arbitrator's refusal to admit evidence
of other incidents which the employer had discovered only after the
discharge.103 The arbitrator found that the grievant had not received
warnings or discipline for any prior misconduct before being dis-
charged and that the evidence did not indicate he could not be rehabil-
itated by progressive discipline. The court of appeals held that, while
it did not condone the grievant's behavior, the arbitrator "was within
the purview of the collective bargaining agreement and public policy
in ordering reinstatement."o4
Similarly, in Communication Workers v. Southeastern Electrical
Cooperative,105 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused to
vacate, on public policy grounds, the award of an arbitrator reinstat-
ing a nineteen-year lineman who had sexually assaulted a customer in
her home.106 The arbitrator had substituted a one month suspension
without pay for the discharge. While acknowledging that preventing
the sexual assault and abuse of women was of "paramount impor-
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. The court of appeals majority and the district court which originally over-
turned the award, Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Intl Bhd. of Team-
sters, 762 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (M.D. Pa. 1991), apparently thought that the
arbitrator did not consider whether or not the grievant had committed the acts
with which he was charged. Judge Becker, dissenting to the decision of the Third
Circuit majority, disagreed with both the result and this observation. He as-
serted that the majority "misapprehends" what the arbitrator decided and finds
that the arbitrator did hold that there was insufficient evidence to find that sex-
ual harassment had occurred. Stroehmann Bakeries v. Local 776, Intl Bhd. of
Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1447 (3d Cir. 1992). For a complete analysis of this
case, see Jay E. Grenig, Due Process and Major Offenses: The Courts and Labor
Arbitration, 48 NAT'L AcAD. ARB. (forthcoming 1995).
102. 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992).
103. Id. at 689 n.4. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
40 n.8. (1987)(involving a similar issue of after-discovered evidence).
104. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d
685, 689 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992).
105. 882 F.2d 467, 468 (10th Cir. 1989).
106. Like Stroehmann Bakeries, this case does not technically involve sexual harass-
ment of a co-worker.
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tance," the court believed that the arbitrator had incorporated this
concern into his determination and that, under the circumstances, it
was within the arbitrator's discretion to determine the remedy and
whether to apply corrective discipline.107
These cases reveal most clearly the central issue of this Article.
Should a court overturn an award because it thinks the decision
"sends a message" inconsistent with some public policy, or would soci-
ety be better served by a rule which limits court review to determining
whether the arbitrator has ordered the employer to commit an illegal
act?
IV. LABOR POLICY AND COURT REVIEW
Consistent with national labor policy, the Supreme Court recog-
nized in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tionlOS that different policy considerations apply to labor arbitration
cases than apply to commercial arbitration cases. As the Court stated:
In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here arbi-
tration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor dis-
putes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary
commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of
commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes
under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bar-
gaining process itself.30 9
As "part and parcel of the collective bargaining process," labor arbitra-
tion provides a means for the parties to receive a final and binding
interpretation of unresolved differences concerning the meaning of the
contract. One benefit of finality is that it may encourage settlement
before the final step of arbitration. This promotes labor peace. An
important part of the process is that a party losing in binding arbitra-
tion is yet free to attempt to secure negotiated language in the next
agreement which will ensure that the disfavored result will not re-
cur.11o A standard for public policy review that is unclear or that al-
lows broad court intrusion risks these benefits of finality. There may
be less desire to settle or negotiate if a party has hopes of court review
as the final forum.
Less obvious is the inevitability of delay if a broad standard of re-
view is adopted. Whether or not an award is ultimately enforced or
vacated, any standard which invites a court to balance or weigh public
107. Communication Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467, 470 (10th
Cir. 1989).
108. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
109. Id. at 578.
110. Thus, an employer, if it is concerned that arbitration would reinstate a person
who has committed sexual harassment, is free to bargain for a clause providing
that specified kinds of behavior shall be cause for immediate discharge rather
than deputizing the arbitrator with the discretion that "just cause" provides.
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policies also invites challenges by parties unhappy with a particular
arbitration decision. Such challenges take time, and time is the en-
emy of the labor relations benefits gained by a final and binding alter-
native dispute resolution system. The longer a labor relations dispute
is allowed to go on, the greater the risk of hostility, mistrust, and
disaffection.",1
As the Court in Misco noted afLer discussing grounds on which
courts should overturn awards, "[i]f the courts were free to intervene
on these grounds, the speedy resolution of grievances by private mech-
anisms would be greatly undermined."11 2 As Judge Posner of the Sev-
enth Circuit has stated: "The most important reason for deference to
labor arbitrators is that labor disputes ought to be resolved rapidly;
and, to be fast, arbitration must be final."113
The Supreme Court has also recognized this need for finality in
labor arbitration in the related area of fair representation suits. In
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,114 a suit against an employer
and union by an employee claiming that the union had violated its
duty of fair representation and that the employer had violated the col-
lective bargaining agreement, the Court reversed a lower court ruling
that a six year statute of limitations applied. As the Court stated:
This system, with its heavy emphasis on grievance, arbitration, and the "law
of the shop," could easily become unworkable if a decision which has given
"meaning and content" to the terms of an agreement, and even affected subse-
quent modifications of the agreement, could suddenly be called into question
as much as six years later. 11 5
A study of reported 1984 and 1985 district court cases involving
review of labor arbitration awards revealed that federal district court
review consumed an average of over 400 days from the date of the
arbitration award to the date the court decision issued.1n 6 When a
party appeals to a higher court, the delays become much greater. The
decision of the court of appeals in Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Interna-
tional Union, Allied Industrial Workers,1 1 7 for example, was issued
111. It has been suggested that some employers try to harm the credibility of unions
by delaying the benefits of the grievance process through court challenge of arbi-
tration awards. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9,
739 F.2d 1159, 1168 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
112. United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
113. Jones Dairy Farm v. Local P-1236, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l
Union, 755 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.)(Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 760 F.2d 173
(7th Cir.)(idea contained in quotation becomes majority position), and cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985).
114. 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
115. Id. at 64. Congress, too, has declared the desirability of"[flinal adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties... for settlement of grievance disputes aris-
ing over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)(1988)(emphasis added).
116. See Ray, supra note 33, at 13, tbl. 2.
117. 952 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1992).
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April 3, 1992. The arbitration award affirmed by the court was issued
July 24, 1989. Thus, although the award was ultimately enforced,
more than two and one-half years passed before the arbitrator's order
of reinstatement and partial back pay was effected. Such delays are
inevitable when the standard for review is unclear and can make the
system "unworkable."
V. THE MEANING OF JUST CAUSE
The arbitration awards under attack for reinstating employees ac-
cused of sexual harassment are attempting to apply the parties' con-
tractual commitment that "just cause" be required for discharge.
Before jumping to its own judgment as to the awfulness of a particular
employee's conduct, a court needs to understand that just cause
means more in a labor contract than whether the employee has com-
mitted the act or acts of which he or she is accused. A broad range of
concerns are implicated.
In an important and useful article,118 Professor Nolan and Dean
Abrams have identified the concept of just cause for discipline as "the
most important principle of labor relations in a unionized firm,"11 9
and a limit on management in virtually every collective bargaining
agreement. They point out that it is a bargain which protects union
interests in fair and consistent discipline, "industrial due process,"120
and "industrial equal protection,"121 while protecting management's
interests in rehabilitation, deterrence, efficiency, and future profitabil-
ity.1 2 2 As they point out, labor arbitrators regularly protect industrial
due process concerns by overturning discharges where employees
have not been put on notice of standards for conduct or penalties,
where an investigation was not conducted before the discharge, or
where, except in cases of extremely serious behavior, progressive dis-
cipline has not been followed. They also note that arbitrators will
overturn discharges where industrial equal protection in the form of
equal treatment of like cases has not been provided. Finally, arbitra-
tors will find a promise of "individualized treatment" in the just cause
language and will give weight to mitigating factors that they believe
the employer should have considered. 12 3
These promises are enforced as part of the collective agreement ne-
gotiated on behalf of all bargaining unit members. When a union as-
118. Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Towards a Theory of Just Cause in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DuxE L.J. 594 (1985).
119. Id. at 594.
120. Id. at 607.
121. Id. at 608.
122. Id. at 603. For an examination of how courts have treated arbitrators' due pro-
cess rulings, see Grenig, supra note 101.
123. Abrams & Nolan, supra note 118, at 609.
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serts interests of industrial due process such as a failure to investigate
or to provide progressive discipline, or industrial equal protection such
as a failure to treat like cases in a like manner, it is asserting the
contractual rights of the entire bargaining unit. The union and its
members may not wish to condone or encourage the particular actions
of the bargaining unit member that led to discipline. Rather, the
group interest in preserving promises of notice, fair investigation, and
progressive discipline is being protected through the vehicle of the in-
dividual employee's grievance.124
Nothing stated above means that the arbitration system down-
plays the seriousness of sexual harassment in the workplace or the
need to remedy it with prompt action. Applying this just cause stan-
dard, arbitrators generally will uphold the termination of employees
discharged for violating employer sexual harassment policies which
incorporate federal guidelines.125
As the Supreme Court noted in Misco, the arbitrator "is to bring
his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a
problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating reme-
dies."126 The issue of whether to modify the discharge penalty as-
sessed by the employer is one that applies this "informed judgment" to
all of the above factors. It is not a scientifically predictable process but
it is what arbitrators do.127 This is the process the parties contracted
for in their collective bargaining agreement.128
124. The concept can be loosely analogized to the use of the exclusionary rule in crimi-
nal law. In theory, at least, it exists to protect the interests of lawful society by
discouraging wrongful search and seizure.
125. See, e.g., Eureka Company, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1151 (1993)(Traynor, Arb.) (up-
holding discharge of 25 year employee who exposed himself to female co-worker);
Dominick's Finer Foods, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 983 (1993)(Winograd,
Arb.)(upholding discharge of long term employee who fondled co-worker. Dis-
charge upheld for first offense where grievant aware of company's sexual harass-
ment policy and company had consistently discharged employees for engaging in
a first offense of sexual harassment.).
126. United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 (1994)(citing
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960)(emphasis added)).
127. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKoumI, How ARBrRATION WoRKs 628
(1973)("Where the agreement fails to deal with the matter [of modifying penal-
ties] the right of the arbitrator to change or modify penalties found to be improper
or too severe may be deemed to be inherent in his power to decide the sufficiency
of cause."). Arbitrator Carroll R. Daugherty set out an extensive checklist of cri-
teria for determining whether just cause standards are met in Grief Bros. Coop-
erage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555, 557-59 (1964)(Daugherty, Arb.). This set of
criteria has been adopted or referenced by many arbitrators. See Abrams & No-
lan, supra note 118, at 599 n.30.
128. See Summers, supra note 33. As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, "[airbitral determination not only of the existence of misconduct but of the
fitness of punishment is routinely grist for the arbitral mill." Gulf States Tel. Co.
v. Local 1692, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 416 F.2d 198, 202 n.10 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Where the arbitrator finds that charges have not been proven,129
however, or that other just cause protections have not been followed,
discipline is sometimes overturnedi3o just as it can be in cases involv-
ing other serious behaviors such as theft.131
VI. TITLE VII ENFORCEMENT AND LABOR ARBITRATION
Before considering vacation of an award, a court should also con-
sider the relationship of the arbitration process to enforcement and
preservation of the public policy asserted. In cases involving sexual
harassment, two considerations are paramount. First, the protection
of sexual harassment victims through Title VII enforcement is com-
pletely independent of, and not limited by, the arbitration award
under attack. Second, because Title VII does not require discharge of
an alleged offender, there is no direct conflict between Title VII
enforcement and reinstatement of employees under a just cause
standard.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,132 the Supreme Court held
that an employee claiming racial discrimination was free to proceed in
a court with a suit claiming violation of Title VII despite the fact that
his claim had already proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator
had ruled that there had been no violation of the antidiscrimination
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The court stated:
[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's
rights under Title VII. It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain
statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to strike....
Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different grounds; it concerns
not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment op-
portunities.... Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the
collective bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the par-
amount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an
employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver. 13 3
129. See, e.g., City of Hayward, 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1080 (1993)(Riker, Arb.).
130. See, e.g., King Soopers, Inc., 101 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 107 (1993)(Snider, Arb.) (reduc-
ing discharge to 20 day suspension for bargaining unit employee who touched
breasts of co-workers, where supervisor had been given only five day suspension
for unwelcome touching and offering work benefits for sexual favors).
131. See, e.g., University of Wisconsin, 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1067 (1993)(Imes,
Arb.)(reducing discharge to 30 day suspension for employee who removed money
from wallet and basing decision on inconsistent enforcement of rule and mitigat-
ing circumstances.) See also New Meiji Market v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Union No. 905, 789 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986)(upholding arbitration
award reinstating with back pay employee who had committed theft from cash
register and holding that it was for arbitrator to determine what was good cause
for discharge as long as the award "draws its essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement").
132. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
133. Id. at 51-52.
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Under this ruling, the union may not waive individual rights con-
ferred by Title VII.
Because an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agree-
ment would not limit the Title VII rights of even the person whose
grievance was arbitrated, by no means can it affect the Title VII rights
of the harassment victim to sue for an adequate remedy.134 The col-
lective bargaining agreement's arbitration provisions and Title VII's
enforcement mechanisms are designed to answer different questions
and are independent of each other.135 This is particularly true where
the arbitration is invoked to resolve only the contract-related rights
134. In its famous footnote 21 to the Gardner-Denver opinion, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that a court applying Title VII could give weight to the decision of an arbi-
trator, the amount of weight given to depend on whether the contract contained
provisions which conformed substantially to Title VII, the degree of procedural
fairness, the adequacy of the record on the issue of discrimination, and the spe-
cial competence of the arbitrator. Id. at 60 n.21. This analysis, of course, applies
only to the rights of the employees whose interests were directly resolved in the
arbitration proceeding. It should not be seen to determine whether the employer
has violated its Title VII duties to the alleged victim of sexual harassment. The
victim's interests were not the focus of the arbitration proceeding.
135. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Supreme
Court held that an employee alleging age discrimination was bound to honor the
written agreement he made in advance to arbitrate all disputes with his em-
ployer. Following Gilmer, courts have required employees to use arbitration
rather than a jury trial to resolve employment discrimination claims if they had
entered into pre-dispute arbitration agreements promising to do so. See, e.g., Al-
ford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991). It must be
stressed, however, that this line of cases involves individual arbitration agree-
ments entered into by unrepresented employees. These decisions do not involve
the Alexander v. Gardner-Denver model of a collectively bargained arbitration
clause governing the grievances of union-represented employees.
Although some have predicted the extension of Gilmer and the erosion of
Gardner-Denver, see, e.g., B. Glenn George, Americans with Disabilities Act and
Civil Rights: Effects of Arbitration, in ARBrrRATnON 1993, ARB. & =H WORLD OF
WoRK, PRoc. op THE FORTY-SIXTH ANN. MEETING, NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 130, 144
(Gladys W. Gruenberg, ed. 1993)('"Gilmer may be the first step in the erosion and
ultimate reversal of Gardner-Denver."), a development with which this author
would disagree, the outcome of the grievance arbitration hearing should not in
any event affect the rights of the victim of sexual harassment. The arbitration
cases under attack resolve only the contractual rights of the alleged harasser and
do not litigate the claims of the victim.
Finally, it has been recently suggested that, after Gilmer, a union-represented
employee's Title VII claim can be dismissed for failure to exhaust arbitral reme-
dies, at least if the contract contains a non-discrimination clause that is subject to
arbitration. David A. Kadue & Hope Jacobson, Trend Requiring Union-Repre-
sented Employees to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, Employment
Discrimination Report (BNA), May 11, 1994, at 594, 595 ("If the language of the
CBA arguably makes the discrimination claim subject to arbitration, then the
claim may be subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust arbitral remedies,
notwithstanding the impression left by a casual reading of Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver."). This argument seems wrong and, in this author's view, would require
a far more explicit overruling of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver than even a broad
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affecting an alleged harasser. Title VII provides the alleged victim of
co-worker harassment with an independent means to ensure that the
employer provides a lawful working environment.36
This independent Title VII remedy is broader and potentially far
more powerful than any labor arbitration award. Unlike arbitrators
who are limited to enforcing the narrow terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, court enforcement offers damages and other relief
not available through labor arbitration.37 Such remedies can provide
a substantial incentive to employers to protect employees' rights to a
workplace free of sexual harassment.
A second matter a court should consider when it is tempted to re-
view a sexual harassment reinstatement case is that a reinstatement
order will not generally violate Title VII. Courts have recognized, in
Title VII cases involving co-worker harassment, that employer reme-
dies should be sufficient to persuade harassers to discontinue unlaw-
ful conduct, but that not all cases of harassment call for discharge.l 38
Indeed, courts reviewing instances of serious harassment have often
reading of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. could provide. It would put
burdens on the labor arbitration system which it is not designed to carry.
136. The proving and perception of sexual harassment can be a difficult matter, with a
broad range of views possible as to what is serious and what should be actionable.
See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1207-08 (1990).
See also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VANi. L. REv. 1183, 1203 (1989).
The Title VII rights of the victim cannot be adequately redressed in an arbi-
tration proceeding designed to test whether the just cause promises of the con-
tract have been kept with regard to the discharge of another person. It is thus
very important that an independent forum such as the federal court remain
available to evaluate such claims and redress any violations of Title VII.
137. The original provisions of Title VII limited a successful plaintiff's recovery to eq-
uitable relief such as reinstatement, back pay, and injunctive relief as well as
attorney's fees. The scope of recovery available to victims of sexual harassment
was substantially enhanced by provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act expanding
remedies to include compensatory and punitive damages. The amendments allow
compensatory and punitive damages ranging from $50,000 to $300,000 depend-
ing on the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(Supp. V 1993). In addi-
tion, when such damages are sought, a jury trial may be demanded. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(c)(Supp. V 1993).
According to a study conducted by the Center for Women in Government,
State University of New York at Albany, the total monetary benefits awarded in
sexual harassment cases handled by the EEOC increased 98% from 1992 to 1993.
Sexual Harassment Awards Studied, Fair Employment Practices Summary of
Latest Developments (BNA), June 6, 1994, at 61. The study reports that, in 1993,
1546 employees won 25.2 million dollars. Id. Thus, Title VII now provides a sub-
stantially greater inducement to employers to maintain a work environment free
of discriminatory influences.
138. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)("We do not think that all har-
assment warrants dismissal.")(citing Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424
(8th Cir. 1984)).
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held that the employer can properly remedy sexual harassment with
steps short of discharge.
In Swentek v. USAIR, Inc.,139 for example, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the employer complied with Title VII by
fully investigating allegations of sexual harassment, issuing written
warnings, and warning the offender that a subsequent infraction
would result in suspension.
Similarly, in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,140 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that the employer satisfied Title VII
standards by reprimanding an employee who engaged in offensive sex-
ual physical contact and verbal harassment and reducing his contact
with the victim.
Finally, in Barrett v. Omaha National Bank,141 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit held that the employer had properly reme-
died a hostile working environment when it fully investigated
allegations of sexual harassment, reprimanded an employee for touch-
ing a co-worker in a sexual manner and talking about sexual activity,
placed him on probation for ninety days, and warned him that any
further misconduct would result in discharge.
The arbitration award attacked and overturned in Newsday pro-
vided for reinstatement without back pay, the equivalent of a lengthy
unpaid suspension. This is a far more serious response than a warn-
ing of possible suspension, or a letter or reprimand.
VII. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The appropriate standard for court review of an arbitration award
on public policy grounds should be a narrow one. Only if the arbitra-
tor's award would compel a party to violate positive law should it be
vacated.
The reasons for adopting such a simple and straightforward ap-
proach are many. Such an approach is consistent with the role of arbi-
tration under a collective bargaining agreement, provides a degree of
predictability to future cases not possible under alternative ap-
proaches that invite more review, and is totally consistent with both
the rationale and outcome of W.R. Grace.
First, it should be recognized that the "contract" at issue is the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement's
provision providing for binding arbitration of contractual disputes
does not violate public policy. A contract provision providing that dis-
cipline, including discharge, must be for "just cause," also does not vio-
139. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
140. 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992)("Title VII does not require that an employer use
the most serious sanction available to punish an offender.. .
141. 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984).
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late public policy. Thus, a court's traditional power to refuse to
enforce a contract that violates public policy does not apply to these
situations.1 42 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has attempted to
make these cases fit the mold, asserting, as the Court did in Misco,
that the question is whether the contract, as interpreted by the arbi-
trator, violates public policy.143 This is different from the mainstream
of public policy contract law.
In a traditional case, it is the job of a court to interpret a contract,
and it will generally read the contract in a manner consistent with
law.144 In a labor arbitration case, it is the arbitrator whose job it is
to read the contract. It is difficult to see how the arbitration award,
the product of a lawful contract's bargained for and lawful dispute res-
olution process, can be unlawful, unless it orders either party to vio-
late the law. It is not the contract that ought be construed by a
reviewing court, but merely the arbitral order. If the order directs the
parties to take an action which they might legally have taken on their
own, it is difficult to see why such an order ought to be struck down.145
Second, it is important to consider the alternatives to the narrow
approach stated. Asking whether an award "condones" misconduct or
undermines the employer's ability to prevent such activityl 46 in-
troduces a high level of subjectivity that would leave vulnerable all
cases involving discharge for misconduct. It also inappropriately sug-
142. Compare Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948).
143. United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987).
144. See, e.g., Williams v. Maremont Corp., 875 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1989).
145. At a November 19, 1993 presentation at the Midwest Arbitrators Symposium at-
tended by the author, Professor Theodore St. Antoine suggested the following test
for whether an award should be set aside on public policy grounds:
In determining whether to sustain or vacate an arbitral award rein-
stating a discharged employee on the grounds of public policy, I believe
the judicial test should be: could the employer (prescinding from the ef-
fect of the collective bargaining agreement) acting on its own have taken
the same action ordered by the arbitrator, without violating any law or
controlling public policy? In effect, I think the employer should be re-
garded as having contracted with the union to "delegate" its authority
over the employee to the arbitrator; what the employer could do (in the
exercise of discretion), the arbitrator can do as well.
Professor Theodore St. Antoine, Presentation at the Midwest Arbitrators Sympo-
sium (Nov. 19, 1993)(copy of remarks on file with author). Similarly, Professor
Charles Craver has suggested that the public policy exception should be re-
stricted to "those extremely rare instances in which the action ordered by the
arbitrator would be wholly improper if directed by the negotiating parties them-
selves." Craver, supra note 33, at 604.
These tests and their contract-based rationale fit perfectly into a logical con-
tract-based framework for judicial review of labor arbitration awards. See gener-
ally Clyde W. Summers, supra note 33.
146. See Stroehmann Bakeries v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436,
1442 (3d Cir. 1992); Newsday Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915,
915 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1990).
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gests that a court should be able to review an employee's past conduct,
find facts, and decide for itself whether he or she should be punished
further.
Similarly, asking whether disfavored conduct is "integral to the
performance of employment duties" and part of an "employment deci-
sion,"'47 while adding a vague limit to the doctrine, provides little gui-
dance for what kind of reinstatements violate public policy. Finally,
giving a court reviewing a reinstatement order the broad authority to
balance a general public policy, like the policy against drug use,
against a general public policy, like the policy in favor of rehabilitat-
ing drug offenders,148 gives the court a free hand to ignore the product
of the parties' negotiated dispute resolution process and, indeed, the
strong statutory policy requiring that the parties negotiate workplace
standards.49
A vague and uncertain public policy exception can only encourage
employers to present court challenges to awards with which they are
unsatisfied.150 Such litigation, with its attendant delays, can only
harm the working and bargaining relationship of the parties without
necessarily enhancing the public policy at issue.
In addition, a rule limiting the public policy exception to cases
where the arbitrator's award directs a party to violate positive law is
consistent with Supreme Court decisions dealing with the relationship
between labor arbitration, Title VII, and other private causes of ac-
tion..5 1 In W.R. Grace, the court enforced an arbitration award in cir-
cumstances where the employer argued that the outcome was
inconsistent with Title VII public policy in the form of a conciliation
agreement between the employer and the EEOC. The employer had
laid off employees in the order called for by the conciliation agreement
and the arbitrator, finding that this order of layoff violated the senior-
ity provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, awarded back
pay to two laid-off grievants.
147. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilot Ass'n Intl, 861 F.2d 665, 671 (11th Cir.
1988).
148. See Oil Workers, Int'l Union, Local No. 4-228 v. Union Oil Co., 818 F.2d 437 (5th
Cir. 1987).
149. Judge Edwards has suggested that a broad public policy exception can "lead to a
de facto evisceration" of the public policy behind the duty to bargain. Edwards,
supra note 4, at 25-27. He argues that a court's decision vacating an arbitrator's
decision which deals with a mandatory subject of bargaining in effect allows the
employer to take unilateral action rather than follow its statutory duty to bargain
over changes. See id. See also Ray, supra note 33, at 12 ("Delay caused by judi-
cial review can cause uncertainty, interfere with the bargaining process and un-
dermine the union.").
150. See Edwards, supra note 4, at 34.
151. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Intl Union of Rubber Workers, 641 U.S.
757 (1983).
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W.R. Grace parallels the sexual harassment reinstatement situa-
tion in two important ways. First, the Court recognized that employ-
ers can have dual obligations. After noting that voluntary compliance
and conciliation under Title VII constituted an important public pol-
icy, the court stated that "[aibsent a judicial determination, the Com-
mission, not to mention the company, cannot alter the collective
bargaining agreement without the Union's consent,"152 and that to
permit such a result would "undermine the federal labor policy that
parties to a collective bargaining agreement must have reasonable as-
surance that their contract will be honored."15 3 Thus, the Court rec-
ognized the importance to national labor policy of preserving the
parties' contractual bargain and, by its decision, indicated that the
employer should be obliged to follow both the policies of Title VII and
its collective bargaining agreement. Similarly, an employer is obliged
by Title VII to provide a workplace free of sexual discrimination and
harassment while also observing the terms of its collective bargaining
agreement.
Second, the W.R. Grace opinion notes that the case involved a "di-
lemma" that "was of the Company's own making."154 It had commit-
ted to "conflicting contractual obligations" and, when it "dishonored its
contract with the Union," it "incurred liability for breach of con-
tract."155 Similarly, an employer that disciplines or discharges an em-
ployee in a manner inconsistent with the contract and argues that
Title VII compels the result is enmeshed in a dilemma of its own mak-
ing.'5 6 Had it taken the steps required by the contract before impos-
ing discipline or discharge, it could have met both its obligations. As
in W.R. Grace, the judicial review process should not be used to extri-
cate a party from either its violations of law or contract.
Finally, a close reading of W.R. Grace indicates that its outcome is
consistent with a rule requiring an explicit violation of law to invali-
date an arbitration on public policy grounds. An added complication
of W.R. Grace was the existence of a federal district court order di-
recting the employer to follow the conciliation agreement at issue.
The employer complied with this order.157 This makes the W.R. Grace
situation a stronger case for vacation than the typical reinstatement
discharge case in which there is no direct order or requirement that a
152. Id. at 771.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 767.
155. Id.
156. Professor Clyde W. Summers has suggested that an award should be set aside on
public policy grounds only if the interest to be protected "is the public's interest,
not the employer's private interest." See Summers, supra note 33, at 1054-55. In
many of the sexual harassment cases, it is really the employer's interest at issue.
157. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Intl Union of the United Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 769 (1983).
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person necessarily be fired. The Court stated, however, that, even as-
suming the district court's order was a mandatory injunction, nothing
in the collective bargaining agreement as interpreted by the arbitrator
required the company to violate that order.158 The Court further
noted that enforcement of the award would "not create intolerable in-
centives to disobey court orders."159
In the sexual harassment arbitration decisions reviewed by courts,
nothing in the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract "required
that the company violate" Title VII.160 Nothing in the award created
"intolerable incentives to disobey" Title VII.161 W.R. Grace is consis-
tent with a rule which requires that an arbitrator's order must explic-
itly require a violation of law before it can be overturned on public
policy grounds.
This rule also is consistent with Supreme Court decisions holding
that national labor statutes do not preempt a state law based claim
merely because the claim involves the same facts or some analysis of
facts. As the Supreme Court held in its 1988 Lingle v. Norge Division
of Magic Chef162 decision, and its 1994 Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris
decision,163 such state law claims are preempted only if resolution of
the state law claim is dependent on interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement.
These cases demonstrate that, in other public policy areas as well,
an employee does not necessarily forfeit available public policy reme-
dies merely because the facts of his or her case have been taken to
arbitration. Since the decisions have the clear effect of ruling that la-
bor arbitration is not an employee's sole safeguard of public policy is-
sues, there is less need for broad public policy review.164
158. Id. at 768.
159. Id. at 769.
160. The arbitration award merely creates an incentive to obey both Title VII and the
collective bargaining agreement rather than allowing the employer to evade its
duties under its negotiated agreement. It may and should discipline persons who
commit acts of sexual harassment. It should, however, do so in a manner consis-
tent with its contractual promises.
161. A standard requiring an "intolerable" incentive to disobey the law requires far
more than a subjective judicial conclusion that an award somehow seems to "con-
done" the past behavior of a single employee.
162. 486 U.S. 399 (1988)(involving discharge for filing workers compensation claim).
163. 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994)(holding that airline and railroad employees claiming
wrongful discharge for reporting safety violations may sue in state court on pub-
lic policy grounds instead of submitting claims to arbitration; Railway Labor Act
does not preempt such state court lawsuits).
164. It should be recognized that there may be a reciprocal relationship between the
standard of review applied to arbitration awards and the degree to which courts
will allow independent lawsuits arising out of the same discharge. Professor Ber-
nard Meltzer has argued, for example, that allowing courts only a very limited
role for public policy review of arbitration awards could have the consequence of
leading to state court suits alleging that a discharge was tortious because it vio-
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The only reason why a court should vacate the award of a labor
arbitrator on public policy grounds is if the award compels a party to
violate positive law. Such limited review is demanded by national la-
bor policy requiring speed and finality from the labor arbitration pro-
cess. Even cases involving reinstatement of individuals discharged for
sexual harassment, one of our most clear public policies, do not re-
quire a different rule. The law provides the victim of sexual harass-
ment with independent remedies against the employer, and the
arbitration awards at issue do not excuse the employer from maintain-
ing a workplace free of discrimination.
Given the current muddled state of the law, however, parties and
arbitrators should take a number of steps to clarify the arbitration
process and reduce the potential for judicial review with its attendant
costs, uncertainties, and delays. An employer wishing to have the ar-
bitrator uphold a discharge for sexual harassment under a just cause
standard must be prepared to prove its case before the arbitrator and
show that it has satisfied each of the elements of just cause. It should
forcefully present its Title VII duties and concerns to the arbitrator
rather than saving such arguments for a court. Further, in cases
where there is a chance of reinstatement, the employer should argue
in the alternative that if reinstatement is directed, it be done in a
manner which will protect the interests of the harassment victim.
A union is in a unique and difficult position. It has a duty to fairly
represent the grievant and, for the benefit of all bargaining union
members, insure that contractual just cause promises are met. On the
other hand, in cases of co-worker harassment, the union also repre-
sents the victim.165 Since most arbitration cases are settled before
hearing, a union should be particularly sensitive to protecting the in-
terests of the victim when settlement terms are negotiated. Often, the
grievant can be reinstated to a shift or location where his presence
will not directly affect the working environment of the victim. This
protects the union's interest in uniform application of just cause provi-
lated public policy. Bernard W. Meltzer, After the Arbitration Award: The Public
Policy Defense, in 40 Paoc. NATL ACAD. ARB. 39, 53 (1987). It may be, however,
that this is not a bad thing. Arbitration is designed primarily to quickly resolve
disputes arising out of the parties' collective bargaining relationship. Recogniz-
ing that other fora may be best suited for state law based tort suits and state and
federal law based discrimination suits frees labor arbitration to do what it does
best. Recognizing that employees remain free to file suit for wrongs not arising
out of the collective bargaining relationship, including those based on public pol-
icy, makes it easier to see why it is not generally necessary for judges to overturn
arbitration awards which they feel send inappropriate messages.
165. The union has a duty to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit. A
union can breach this duty of fair representation by actions that are "arbitrary,
discriminatory or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 184-85 (1967).
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sions while recognizing the victim's right to a work environment free
of harassment. If the case goes to hearing, the union will want to pro-
vide detailed evidence to establish the possibility that deterrence
and rehabilitation can be accomplished with a remedy short of
discharge.166
Both parties should consider the issue of sexual harassment in ne-
gotiations. Explicit contract provisions detailing how such cases are
to be handled can eliminate much of the uncertainty found in the arbi-
tration system and limit the possibility of judicial review.
As for arbitrators, the decision and opinion can be structured in a
manner to minimize the risk of judicial review or reversal. Cases in
which the arbitrator has decided that the contract requires reinstate-
ment of a person accused of harassment require care. Given the
propensities of some courts and the acknowledged importance of elimi-
nating sexual harassment from the workplace, the arbitrator should
explicitly acknowledge that he or she is aware of and has considered
the employer's Title VII duties to eliminate sexual harassment. The
arbitrator should explicitly state that she or he does not intend by the
award to send a message condoning sexual harassment and then ex-
plain the contractual concerns that require reinstatement. In framing
a remedy, the arbitrator should be sensitive to two issues. First, if the
grievant has been found to have committed an act of sexual harass-
ment, but the arbitrator determines that a sanction less than dis-
charge is required by the contract, a finding that the recommended
sanction should be sufficient to deter further acts of harassment will
go a long way toward insulating the award from review, even under
the currently confused state of the law. Second, if the grievant is to be
reinstated, a remedy that is sensitive to the needs of the victims or
potential victims of harassment can often be tailored. What is impor-
tant under Title VII is providing employees with a nondiscriminatory
working environment, and a remedy can often be tailored that will
give the employer flexibility to avoid reinstating a grievant into the
victim's immediate work environment.
In summary, the interests of collective bargaining and preserving
the workplace bargain requiring just cause for discharge are not nec-
essarily incompatible with Title VII and an employer's duty to provide
a working environment free of sex discrimination. A standard of court
review which allows arbitration awards to be overturned on public
policy grounds only if they order a party to violate the law will not
compromise the important Title VII interests underlying sexual har-
assment rules and will add much needed predictability to the entire
question of court review of arbitration awards. The finality of arbitra-
tion awards is itself an important public policy.
166. See Gould, supra note 33, at 493.
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